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FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS
DURING THE FIRST RECONSTRUCTION
Robert J. Kaczorowski*
Introduction

The movie, "Mvississippi Burning,"' dramatizes the story of the
F.B.I.'s investigation into the murders of three civil rights workers
in Jessup County, Mississippi. This story was one of a number of
similar stories of the 1960s that arose out of the attempt by Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson to enforce the civil
rights of citizens living in the South by marshalling the power of
federal law enforcement and the military.2 This effort represented
a remarkable interposition of the nation's power to enforce citizens' rights and to protect them from the violent resistence of terrorist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan.
Although most Americans believe that these government activities were unprecedented, a similar application of federal executive
power to enforce civil rights occurred in the 1870s. President
Ulysses S. Grant was the first American president systematically to
use such power to protect the personal safety and to enforce the
fundamental rights of American citizens in the interest of racial
equality. 3 Indeed, the Grant Administration's civil rights enforcement policy was, in certain respects, far more remarkable than that
of a century later. The first Ku Klux Klan was just as ruthless as its
twentieth-century counterpart, but even more pervasive.4 How* © Robert J. Kaczorowski, Professor of Law, Fordham University School of
Law. B.S.C., Loyola University, Chicago (1960); M.A., DePaul University (1967);
Ph.D., University of Minnesota (1971); J.D., New York University (1982).
The author wishes to express his gratitude to Fordham University School of Law,
which provided financial support for work on this article.
1. MIsisIssiPPI BURNING (Orion Pictures 1988).
2. See CIVIL RIol-rrs AND THE SoUTH, A SyMPOSIuM (Leonard W. Levy ed.,
1971); LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (Donald B. King & Charles
W. Quick eds., 1965); SOUTHERN JUSTICE (Leon Friedman ed., 1965).
3. See ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION:
THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876
(1985) (providing a legal, administrative, and political history of the national government's efforts to enforce civil rights during Reconstruction).
4. ALLEN TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR: THE KU KLUX KLAN CONSPIRACY AND
SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION (1971) (providing the best account of the Ku Klux Klan
during Reconstruction). See also ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: 1863-1877 (1988) (providing the best general history of the

Reconstruction);

DAVID MARK CHALMERS, HOODED AMERICANISM: THE HISTORY
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ever, the Grant Administration did not enjoy the resources which
were available to Kennedy's and Johnson's adminstrations. 5 This
essay recounts the heroic efforts of federal legal officers and judges
to enforce citizens' rights during the 1870s.
Part I sets forth the historical events giving rise to the enforcement effort of the Grant Administration. Part II details the
problems which the federal executive branch faced when it aggressively prosecuted civil rights violations. Part III details the
problems which the federal judiciary faced in administering the
civil rights prosecutions brought by the executive branch. Part IV
details the national political problems that eventually ended effective enforcement of federal civil rights laws. This Essay concludes
that, notwithstanding the problems faced by the federal executive
and judicial branches which hindered effective enforcement of civil
rights, federal legal officers succeeded in destroying the Ku Klux
Klan. Nonetheless, national political developments finally ended
any hope of vindicating the civil rights of blacks until the twentieth
century.
I. Historical Background
The presidential campaign of 1868 resulting in the election of
President Grant revealed that the American Civil War had not really ended in 1865, but that it had resumed as a guerilla war. 6 During the presidential campaign, the Ku Klux Klan emerged as a
paramilitary wing of the Democratic Party 7 and embarked on a
campaign of terror for the purpose of destroying the Republican
Party in the Southern states and reducing Southern blacks to the
OF THE Ku KLUX KLAN (3d ed. 1987) (providing a history of the Klan in the twentieth

century).
5. WILLIAM GILLETrE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION 1869-1879 (1979) (an
excellent history of the Grant Administration, including Grant's Southern policy,
although I do not agree with all of Gillette's conclusions). See also KACZOROWSKI,
supra note 3, at 83-115 (documenting the persistence of inadequate financial and
human resources to enforce civil rights during Reconstruction, the insurmountable
obstacles federal legal officers encountered, and the ultimate failure of will permanently to secure citizen's rights); TRELEASE, supra note 4; MICHAEL R. BELKNAP,
FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL VIOLENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFLICT IN THE POST-BROWN SOUTH (1987) (providing one of the best accounts of

civil rights enforcement during the Kennedy and Johnson years); DAVID J. GARROW,
BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN

LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1986) (providing an excellent account of enforcement of

civil rights during the administrations of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson).
6. See KACZOROWSKI, supra note 3, at 50-72; TRELEASE, supra note 4, at 113-75.
7. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 3, at 53-55.
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control of white supremacists. 8 After Grant's election, Klan terrorism became more pervasive, more systematic and more effective in
terrorizing black and white Republicans in the South. The Klan
overwhelmed civil government and the administration of civil and
criminal justice in portions of the Southern states 9. Southern
Republicans were at the mercy of roving bands of Klansmen who
attacked them with virtual impunity.' 0 Klan violence took the
forms of beatings, whippings, lynchings, shootings, rapes and torture." The savagery of these crimes moved United States Circuit
Court Judge Hugh Lennox Bond, whose native state was Maryland, to report to his wife that he "never believed such a state of
things existed in the U.S."'1 2 Fearful for his own safety, he con-

fided: "I will tell you all when I come home what I am afraid to
pour out on paper."'1 3 Victims of Klan violence were unable to
look to local law enforcement officers because local officers often
were Klansmen who participated in the terrorism. Even when local officials wanted to bring the criminals to justice, fear or weakness prevented them from doing so. Often, the enormous number
of Klansmen who engaged in a single incident of terrorism overwhelmed the meager resources of local governments. 14 For example, one incident in York County, South Carolina involved almost
three thousand Klansmen.
Congress chose to combat this civil insurrection with federal
legal process.' 5 In statutes enacted in 187016 and 1871,'7 Congress
8. Id
9. Id.
10. Id. at 54.
11. Id
12. Letter from Hugh Lennox Bond, U.S. Cir. Judge, N.C., to Anna Bond (Feb. 9,
1871), inHuGH LENNOX BOND PAPERS, The Maryland Historical Society [hereinafter
BOND PAPERS]; Letter from Hugh Lennox Bond, U.S. Cir. Judge, N.C., to Anna Bond
(June 14, 1871), in BoND)PAPERS, supra (providing an account by Judge Bond to his
wife of a woman who had been dragged from her cabin, beaten, and "her hair singed
off her privates."); Letter from Hugh Lennox Bond, U.S. Cir. Judge, N.C., to Anna
Bond (n.d.), inBOND PAPERS, supra (this, and other crimes, led him to conclude, "I
do not believe that any province in China has less to do with Christian civilization
than many parts of these states.").
13. Letter from Hugh Lennox Bond, U.S. Cir. Judge, N.C., to Anna Bond (Feb. 9,
1871), in BOND PAPERS, supra note 12.
14. Letter from Daniel T. Corbin, U.S. Att'y, S.C., to George H. Williams, U.S.
Att'y Gen. (Nov. 21, 1872), inSOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, National Archives
[hereinafter SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FiLE] (M.D. Ala.); Letter from Daniel T.
Corbin, U.S. Att'y, S.C., to George H. Williams,,U.S. Att'y Gen. (Dec. 15, 1872), in
SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra (M.D. Ala.).
15. See JoirNr SELECr COMMITEE ON THE CONDITIONS OF AFFAIRS IN THE LATE
INSURRECTIONARY STATES, 42d Cong., 2d Sess., H.R. REP. No. 22 and S. REP. No. 41
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established that the Department of Justice and the federal judiciary
would serve as bulwarks against the Klan. Indeed, in many Southern states federal attorneys, marshalls and judges, assisted by small
military forces, provided virtually the only police protection and
criminal justice available to blacks and white Republicans. Federal
judges and Justice Department lawyers embarked on an heroic, albeit short-lived, effort to secure the personal safety and enforce the
fundamental rights of American citizens. The effort was more dangerous and far more difficult during Reconstruction than during
18
the 1960s.
11. The Federal Executive Branch
Congress created the Department of Justice in 1870 in large part
for the purpose of providing more effective protection against
Klan terrorism. 19 In 1870, President Grant appointed Amos T.
Akerman as Attorney General. Akerman was a principal organizer of the Republican Party in his native state of Georgia. As a
scalawag, he knew firsthand what Republicans in the South were
subjected to, and he was determined to come to their aid. 20 At the
same time, Grant appointed Benjamin Helm Bristow as Solicitor
General. Prior to his appointment, Bristow served as the United
States Attorney for the District of Kentucky. With the cooperation of Federal Judge Bland Ballard, Bristow provided virtually the
only justice black Kentuckians obtained in the 1860s. 21 By appointing Akerman and Bristow, both noted defenders of federal
(13 vols.) [hereinafter KKK REPORT] (contains complete documentation of the investigation of the extent of Klan terrorism in the South by a special committee created by
Congress comprised of members of both the House and the Senate. Both Houses of
Congress published the committee's hearings and the evidence received in the 13 vol-

ume report).
16. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
17. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).

18.

KACZOROWSKI, supra note 3, at 49-115.
ALBANY L.J. 355 (May 7, 1870); 5 AM.
See KACZOROWSKI, supra note 3, at 54.

19. 1

20.

L. REV. 159-81 (Oct. 1870).

"Scalawag" is a "term of opprobrium applied by conservative southerners to native
whites who joined with the freedmen and the carpetbaggers in support of Republican
policies during Radical Reconstruction.... Comprising approximately 20 percent of
the white electorate, they often provided the crucial margin of victory for the Repub-

licans."

CONCISE DICrIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY

931 (1983). "Carpetbagger"

is a derogatory term referring to "[n]orthe:.ners who went to the South at the end of

the 21.
CivilKACZOROWSKI,
War and became
active in politics as Republicans." Id. at 164.
supra
note 3, at 12, 52-53, 80. Bristow and other federal legal
officers were assisted by a Louisville, Kentucky lawyer by the name of John Marshall
Harlan. For his civil rights work during this period, Grant appointed Harlan to the
United States Supreme Court. Id. at 143, 201.
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civil rights, to the two highest law enforcement positions in the federal executive branch, President Grant signalled his commitment to
the vigorous enforcement of federal. civil rights.
Reports of Klan terrorism poured into the newly created Department of Justice from federal legal officers in the Southern
states. 22 These reports revealed that the Klan was organized,
drilled and armed. They described the Klan as a paramilitary
group fighting a rearguard action on behalf of "the old disunion
secession doctrine that led the South into" the Civil War.2 3 -These
reports persuaded Attorney General Akerman that "these combinations amount to war, and cannot be crushed on any other theory."' 24 Judge Bond, as an on-the-scene observer, believed that
martial law was the only effective way to combat the Klan.-5 Congress, however, decided to combat the Klan through ordinary criminal process, notwithstanding its authorization of the President to
declare martial law in the event this became necessary.26
Within a month of taking office in June 1870, Akerman instructed federal legal officers to prosecute every reported violation
of federal civil rights laws. 27 He believed that only the most vigorous enforcement of federal law "against all parties who may be
guilty" had any hope of stopping Klan violence. 8 His experiences
in Southern states taught him that "[tjhe policy of coaxing those of
our people who are unfriendly to the Government has utterly
22. See id. at 49-78 (providing a discussion of the reports and citations to the voluminous correspondence among United States Attorneys General and United States
attorneys, federal marshals, federal judges, and political leaders).

23. Letter from John A. Minnis, U.S. Att'y, Ala., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y
Gen. (Dec. 28, 1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N.D. Ala.).
24. Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen., to B.D. Silliman (Nov. 9,
1871), 1 Letterbooks 90-93, in AMos T. AKERMAN PAPERS, Alderman Library, University of Virginia [hereinafter AKERMAN PAPERS].

25. Letter from Hugh Lennox Bond, U.S. Cir. Judge, N.C., to Anna Bond (Sept.
20, 1871), in BOND PAPERS, supra note 12.
26. Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
27. Circular Relative to Rights of Citizens to Vote in the Several States, (July 28,
1870), in CIRCULARS OF THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, National Archives [hereinafter

CIRCULARS]; Circular Relative to the Enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment,
(July 6, 1871), in CIRCULARS, supra. See also Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S.
Att'y Gen., to Robert A. Hill, U.S. Dist. Judge, Miss. (Sept. 12, 1871), 1 Letterbooks
70-71, in AKERMAN PAPERS, supra note 24 (demonstrating a good example of
Akerman's urgings to federal officials).
28. Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen., to E.P. Jacobson, U.S. Att'y,
Miss. (Aug. 18, 1871), 1 Letterbooks 44-46, in AKERMAN PAPERS, supra note 24 (It
was his "opinion that nothing is more idle than an attempt to conciliate by kindness"
the malcontents in the Southern States).
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failed hitherto."29' Klansmen "take all kindness on the part of the
Government as evidence of timidity, and hence are emboldened to
lawlessness by it," he informed a United States attorney. 30
Although he believed it to be "impossible for the Government to
win their affection," it could nonetheless "command their respect
by the exercise of its powers."' 31 Federal judges had a particularly
important role: it was their business "to terrify evil doers." 32 Solicitor General Bristow shared this view and urged federal legal officers to prosecute even men of the highest social standing, making
examples of them. 33 "The higher the social standing and character
of the convicted party," he instructed the United States attorney
for the District of North Carolina, "the more important is a vigor'34
ous prosecution and prompt execution of judgment.
Although. some of the obstacles to civil rights enforcement were
common to the 1870s and the 1960s, in other respects, far more
dangerous and trying obstacles existed in the 1870s. A gross insufficiency in personnel and funding impeded enforcement in the
1870S, 35 but not the 1960s. Federal judges and prosecutors in the
1870s suffered from inadequate resources to investigate, prosecute
and try crimes. They did not possess a federal agency with the law
enforcement expertise and professionalism of the modem Federal
Bureau of Investigation; nor did they have access to a large standing military force, or to the virtually unlimited financial resources
that were available to federal officials in the 1960s. The geographical area assigned to a United States attorney was formidably large
for an era when the remote areas in which many crimes were committed were not easily or rapidly accessible. A single incident
might involve hundreds of suspects. Forced to travel hundreds of
miles to the scene of a crime and to spend weeks working on their
cases, federal prosecutors were simply overwhelmed.36 They often
29. Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen., to John H. Caldwell (Nov.
10, 1871), 1 Letterbooks 113-17, in AKERMAN PAPERS, supra note 24.
30. Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen., to E.P. Jacobson, U.S. Att'y,
Miss. (Aug. 18, 1871), 1 Letterbooks 44-46, in AKERMAN PAPERS, supra note 24.
31. Id.
32. 1d
33. Letter from Benjamin H. Bristow, Solicitor Gen., to D.H. Starbuck, U.S.
Att'y, N.C. (Oct. 2, 1871), Instruction Book B2, at 388-89, reel 2, in INSTRUCnONS TO
U.S. ATTORNEYS AND MARSHALLS, 1867-1904, microfilm copy, National Archives
[hereinafter INSTRUCTIONS].

34. l
35. See KACZOROWSKI, supra note 3, at 79-96.
36. See Letter from John A. Minnis, U.S. Att'y, Ala., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S.
Att'y Gen. (Sept. 8, 1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N.D.
Ala.); Letter from John A. Minnis, U.S. Att'y, Ala., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y
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worked every day and night of the week in preparing a case for
trial. They would participate in trial during the day, and because
they did not have the secretaries and law clerks which today are
available to Justice Department lawyers, 1870s prosecutors would
use the nights to record the evidence presented each day. When a
grand jury was in session, prosecutors presented evidence to gain
indictments during the day, and at night they would prepare their
evidence and strategy for the next day. Moreover, at the very time
that they were trying defendants indicted by prior grand juries, federal prosecutors were forced to prepare new cases to present to the
current grand jury.37
For example, United States Attorney for the District of Tennessee R. McPhail Smith, warned newly appointed United States Circuit Court Judge, Halmer H. Emmons, not to expect too much
when Smith appeared before him: "I fear that it will not be in my
power to get up for you anything like the preparation you will desire." Smith explained:
I have no means of assembling my witnesses & conferring with

them prior to the trial of cases. We have usually relied, in criminal cases at least, upon eliciting from witnesses, whose testimony
obtained the indictment before the grand jury, the details of the
case for the first time when upon the stand.3"
U.S. Attorney Smith did not even have an assistant to take notes
during grand jury hearings and criminal trials. Judge Emmons defended him against the attacks of other federal officials who accused him of inefficiency and a "want of zeal." He informed
Gen. (Sept. 13, 1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N.D. Ala.);
Letter from Major W. Brown to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Nov. 14, 1871),
in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (S.C.); Letter from Hugh Lennox
Bond, U.S. Cir. Judge, N.C., to Anna Bond (Sept. 17, 1871), in BOND PAPERS, supra
note 12; Letter from Hugh Lennox Bond, U.S. Cir. Judge, N.C., to Anna Bond (Dec.
18, 1871), in BOND PAPERS, supra note 12.
37. Letter from E.P. Jacobson, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y
Gen. (Sept. 13, 1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (S.D. Miss.);
Letter from E.P. Jacobson, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen.
(n.d.), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (S.D. Miss.); Letter from G.
Wiley Wells, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Dec. 11, 1871),
in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N.D. Miss.); Letter from Daniel T.
Corbin, U.S. Att'y, S.C., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Nov. 3, 1871), in
SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (S.C.); Letter from Daniel T. Corbin,
U.S. Att'y, S.C., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Nov. 20, 1871), in SOURCE
CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (S.C.).
38. Letter from R. McPhail Smith, U.S. Att'y, Tenn., to Halmer H. Emmons, U.S.
Cir. Judge, Tenn. (Apr. 12, 1871) (box 1, folder 1), in HALMER H. EMMONS PAPERS,
Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library [hereinafter EMMONS PAPERS].
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Attorney General Akerman of the impossible conditions under
which the federal prosecutor labored and concluded:
I am only surprised at the progress he has made in securing testimony, scattered as it is over the district, in so many of the hundreds of cases under his charge. As a matter of course, he
cannot unaided prepare as they should by any considerable
number of them upon the facts, and have one moment left for
legal examination.39

Requests for assistance poured into the office of the Attorney
General. Federal prosecutors pleaded for assistant counsel, investigators, clerks and stenographers to help them prepare their cases.
They also asked for military support in making arrests, in holding
prisoners for trial and in protecting government witnesses and federal officials during trials. 40 The Attorney General continuously
lobbied Congress for greater financial support. Nevertheless, ap39. Letter from Daniel T. Corbin, U.S. Att'y, S.C., to George H. Williams, U.S.
Att'y Gen. (Nov. 21, 1872), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (S.C.).
See Letter from R. McPhail Smith, U.S. Att'y, Tenn., to Halmer H. Emmons, U.S. Cir.
Judge, Tenn. (June 9, 1871) (box 2, folder 2), in EMMONS PAPERS, supra note 38;
Letter from E.P. Jacobson, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen.

(Sept. 13, 1871), inSOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (S.D. Miss.); Letter
from Allen P. Huggins to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen. (June 28, 1871), in
SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note

14 (N.D. Miss).

The enormous expansion of federal court dockets as a result of Civil War and Reconstruction legislation hindered enforcement of federal civil rights. by the federal
executive branch. The increase in the business of the federal courts was due to the
enactment of revenue laws and the civil rights statutes. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 3,
at 60. By 1871, Attorney General Akerman confided to a friend: "I am on the rack
from morning till night, and frequently far into the night, and yet, with all that, I can
hardly keep down this pile of business." Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y
Gen., to John N. Montgomery (Aug. 21, 1871), 1 Letterbooks 47-49, in AKERMAN
PAPERS, supra note 24. He explained that the rising case-load resulted from the great
expansion of federal jurisdiction. Moreover, he cited the mistrust of state courts felt
by many litigants. Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen., to James Jackson

(Nov. 20, 1871), 1 Letterbooks 149-60, in

AKERMAN PAPERS,

supra note 24.

40. See, e.g., Letter from Benjamin H. Bristow, Solicitor Gen., to Amos T.
Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Aug. 8,1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra
note 14 (Ky.); Letter from E.P. Jacobson, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to Amos T. Akerman,
U.S. Att'y Gen. (n.d.), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (S.D. Miss.);
Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen., to E.P. Jacobson, U.S. Att'y, Miss.
(Aug. 15, 1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (S.D. Miss.); Letter
from E.P. Jacobson, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Sept.
13, 1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (S.D. Miss.); Letter from
Robert A. Hill, U.S. Dist. Judge, Miss., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen. (June
23, 1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N.D. Miss.); Letter from
G. Wiley Wells, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Aug. 21,
1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N.D. Miss.); Letter from G.
Wiley Wells, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Dec. 11, 1871),
in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N.D. Miss.); Letter from D.H. Star-
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propriations remained insufficient, even when Congress made special allocations for civil rights enforcement. 4 The contradiction in
the administration's civil rights enforcement policy quickly became
apparent. While the Attorney General admonished federal prosecutors vigorously to enforce federal civil rights laws, he also informed them that "the strictest economy is a necessity. ' 42 This
problematical policy placed federal legal officers in an untenable
position. One lamented: "Attorney General it is too bad to let us
fight this thing against all the public opinion as single handed as we
are. We43 need more force enough to inspire respect and command
order. "
Another obstacle to 1870s prosecutions was the fact that federal
officers lived in the communities in which they worked and therefore were more vulnerable to intimidation than were their 1960s
counterparts. Similarly, the identities of the victims and of the perpetrators of Klan crimes presented an obstacle to the enforcement
of civil rights in the 1870s. The Klan preyed upon the most vulnerable and defenseless citizens of the South. Justice Department lawyers reported that victims often were so "ignorant, poor and timid"
that they lacked "the knowledge, the means, [and] the courage to
bring [complaints] to the notice of the proper authorities." 44 Many
of the victims of Klan crimes Were poor, black rustics on the margin of society. Even when the victims possessed the knowledge
and means to initiate prosecutions, they often were reluctant to file
charges or to testify against their assailants because of the odds
against conviction.
Many Klansmen were respected members of the community
whose Klan activity was perceived by the majority of white
southerners as an attempt to restore the proper order of Southern
society. Defendants frequently enjoyed the advantages of wealth,
political influence and social prominence. They used their influence against federal prosecutors.4 5 The governor of North Carobuck, U.S. Att'y, N.C., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen. (July 9, 1871), in
SotURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N.C.).
41. KACZOROWSI, supra note 3, at 84-85, 101-02.
42. Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen., to Robert A. Hill, U.S. Dist.

Judge, Miss. (July 27, 1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N.D.
Miss.).
43. Letter from Allen P. Huggins to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen. (n.d.), in
SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N.D. Miss.).
44. Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen., to J. Caldwell (July 22, 1871),
Instruction Book B2, at 289-90, reel 2, in INSTRUcTIONS, supra note 33.
45. Letter from E.P. Jacobson, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y
Gen. (July 5, 1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (S.D. Miss.);
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lina, for example, intervened in federal prosecutions in that state.
First, he delayed them. Then, after the initial trials resulted in convictions, he and other Southern white leaders pressed the sentencing judge to suspend the sentences of those convicted. The
sentencing judge resisted such undue pressure only through the intervention of the United States Attorney General.16 Because of
these disparities in local power, federal legal officers often were
unable to obtain the cooperation of bystander witnesses or victims.
This lack of cooperation, and even outright obstruction, disheartened federal legal officers
and reduced their incentive to enforce
47
civil rights statutes.
Law enforcement was further hindered by the way in which
many Southern whites viewed the Republican-dominated federal
government, the Republican Party's local constituency and the
Klan.48 Most Southern whites considered the Republican Party in
the South to be illegitimate. Its illegitimacy was due, in part, to the
party's constituency of former slaves, scalawags and carpetbaggers. 4 9 Federal legal officers were perceived by many white
Southerners as agents of these disparaged groups and the cause of
civil disorder. They were disrupting Southern society by imposing
a federal legal regime through military force, thus defeating democratic political processes.50
Effective law enforcement ultimately depends on the support
and cooperation of the members of a community. However, many
Southerners believed that resistance to federal law enforcement
was required to defend legitimate law and order. In this view, the
Klan was not a criminal organization, but rather a group of patriots
striving to restore power to the legitimate leaders of Southern
Letter from John A. Minnis, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen.
(Nov. 26, 1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N.D. Ala.); Letter
from John A. Minnis, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Dec.
1, 1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N.D. Ala.). See Letter
from E. Camp to Halmer H. Emmons, U.S. Cir. Judge, Tenn. (Nov. 11, 1871) (box 1,
folder 4), in EMMONS PAPERS, supra note 38 (showing that sometimes federal officers
risked dismissal for political reasons).
46. Letter from D.H. Starbuck, U.S. Att'y, N.C., to Benjamin H. Bristow, Solicitor
Gen. (Oct. 5, 1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N.C.); Letter
from Hugh Lennox Bond, U.S. Cir. Judge, N.C., to Anna Bond (Sept. 28, 1871), in
BOND PAPERS,

supra note 12.

47. See supra note 36.
48. Letter from Richard Busteed, U.S. Dist. Judge, Ala., to George H. Williams,
U.S. Att'y Gen. (Mar. 29, 1872), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supranote 14 (N.
& M.D. Ala.).
49. Id
50. lit
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white communities. They excused the Klan's guerilla tactics of
force and terror as a necessary defense of local autonomy against a
despotic central government possessing vastly greater regular
forces. Thus, local residents actively and passively impeded federal
law enforcement: they alerted suspects when federal agents attempted an arrest, enabling armed resistance or flight. They even
attacked federal officers after arrests had been made, permitting
an arrest
suspects to escape. 5 ' On occasion, federal officers making
52 Victims of
officials.
local
by
jailed
and
arrested
were themselves
Klan violence who filed complaints and testified in federal prosecutions suffered similar mistreatment. 53 Federal prosecutions of
Klansmen and local retaliation through state legal process extended the Civil War struggle between the North and the South,
and between national sovereignty and state rights, to federal and
local courthouses and jails.
While local communities rallied to assist suspects in avoiding
arrest, they also helped Klansmen who were brought to trial. Fund
drives raised money to hire the best lawyers to defend "'our boys'
that have been kidnapped by the Yankees. '54 "Money seems like
water for 'our boys,'" sarcastically complained a federal marshall
in Mississippi.55 Supporters "will go to any extreme to get them
clear," he reported to Attorney General Akerman in June 1871.56
Indeed, they did. Wade Hampton, for example, led a campaign
that raised $10,000 and retained President Andrew Johnson's Attorney General, Henry Stanbery, and the leading constitutional authority of the United States Senate, Senator Reverdy Johnson of

51. Letter from E.P. Jacobson, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y
Gen. (July 18, 1871), inSOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (S.D. Miss.).

52. Letter from G. Wiley Wells, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S.
Att'y Gen. (July 15, 1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N.D.

Miss.).
53. Letter from F. Thkey to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Dec. 1871), in
SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (Va.). See Letter from H.H. Wells,

U.S. Att'y, Va., to George H. Williams, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Jan. 23, 1872), inSOURCE
CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (Va.); Letter from H.H. Wells, U.S. Att'y, Va.,
to George H. Williams, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Feb. 11, 1872), inSOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL
FILE, supra note 14 (Va.); Letter from H.H. Wells, U.S. Att'y, Va., to George H. Williams, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Feb. 20, 1872), inSOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note
14 (Va.) (discussing the Washington Fauntleroy case).
54. Letter from Allen P. Huggins to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen. (June 28,
1871), inSOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE supra note 14 (N.D. Miss.).
55. Id.

56. i
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Maryland. 7 These highly skilled attorneys defended Klansmen in
federal prosecutions at Columbia, South Carolina and challenged
the federal court's jurisdiction all the way to the United States
Supreme Court on the grounds that the federal civil rights statutes
were unconstitutional. The Court avoided a decision on the merits
by dismissing the appeal on procedural grounds.58 Leading members of the local bar frequently donated their services to defend
other Klansmen standing accused of federal civil rights. violations.
Typically, Klansmen were represented by the best lawyers
available. 9
Federal civil rights prosecutions in the 1870s were also impeded
by the way in which federal courts were administered. Federal
judges "rode the circuit" among different towns and cities in their
judicial districts, meeting infrequently and for relatively brief periods of time. It was difficult to get witnesses to leave their homes to
travel daunting distances. An additional disincentive was the possibility that the federal judge would be too pressed for time to try
the case at the scheduled time and site. The sheer number of docketed prosecutions would have required months to try before judges
sitting continuously in accordance with modem practice.60 In the
1870s, however, federal judges usually convened court quarterly
for two week periods. At these quarterly sessions, the judge was
required to try the many civil and criminal cases on the court
docket, to empanel grand juries and to attend to sundry other matters. The problem was compounded by the fact that federal court
dockets expanded exponentially after the Civil War because of the
passage of the civil rights statutes and federal revenue laws. Necessarily, then, judicial business unrelated to Klan prosecutions interfered with the conduct of civil rights
trials, leaving federal
'61
annoyed."
and
"harassed
prosecutors
The circumstances of the commission of Klan crimes and the
technicalities of federal civil rights statutes complicated the government's preparation for trial. The collection of evidence was difficult because the crimes often were committed late at night, under
57. CHARLESTON DAILY COURIER, Nov. 25, 1871, at 1; N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1871,
at 3; N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1871, at 2.
58. United States v. Avery, 80 U.S. 251 (1871); Letter from Robert A. Hill, U.S.

Dist. Judge, Miss., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen. (June 21, 1871), in SOURCE
CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N.D. Miss.).
59. See KACZOROWSKI, supra note 3, at 59.

60. See supra note 39.
61. See KACZOROWSKI, supra note 3, at 59.
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cover of disguise, by *mensworn to secrecy.62 Lack of direct evidence led to forensic problems. A federal prosecutor in Mississippi
informed Attorney General Akerman that these cases required
"laborious arrangement and preparation" because the evidence "is
almost wholly circumstantial and of such a nice character that if it
does not receive the closest attention, the Government cannot expect to succeed in the prosecution. ' 63 The complexities of federal
civil rights law further handicapped prosecutors. Federal civil
rights statutes required prosecutors to prove that the defendants
committed these crimes out of racial animus or with the intent to
deprive the victim of some constitutional right. Intent is arguably
the most difficult element of a crime to prove. In light of these
legal technicalities and the circumstantial nature of available evidence, trial preparation required "the examination of many witnesses, which will have to be repeated in most of the cases," a
prosecutor reported to the Attorney General. 6 He complained
that the "preparation of these cases will require great and attentive
care,'and, in view of the wealth and influence opposed to the Government, they are in themselves more than one counsel can attend
to., 65
The indictments had to be drafted very carefully because of the
plenary authority federal civil rights statutes conferred on federal
courts and prosecutors to secure the personal safety of American
citizens. Certain provisions of federal civil rights statutes based
federal punishments for civil rights violations on state penal codes
for comparable crimes under state criminal law.' Thus, if the defendants killed a political activist, the federal indictment would
charge them with violating the victim's constitutionally protected
rights to life and liberty and with murder as the means by which
they deprived him of these civil rights. 67 Justice Department lawyers thus prosecuted Klansmen for civil rights violations that also
constituted crimes under state law, crimes such as murder, assault,
assault with intent to kill, burglary, rape, etc. They agonized over
the drafting of indictments that reflected the nature of these crimes
62. Letter from E.P. Jacobson, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y

Gen. (n.d.), in

SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE,

supra note 14 (N.D. Miss.).

63. Letter from E.P. Jacobson, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y
Gen. (Sept. 13, 1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N.D. Miss.).
64. Id.

65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Section 7 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
67. See, e.g., K.K.K. REPORT, supra note 15, vol. 12, at 934-87.
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while avoiding jurisdictional problems relating to state criminal
codes.68
Significantly, federal judges uniformly upheld jurisdiction and interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as delegating to Congress
plenary authority to enforce the fundamental rights of American
citizens.6 9 For example, Judge Richard Busteed, United States District Judge for Alabama, declared that the Fourteenth Amendment
delegated to Congress the power "to pass police laws to operate
within the political limits of a State to the exclusion of the police
regulations of any State, and to punish the violations of such
laws." 70 He upheld federal jurisdiction in all prosecutions involving combinations of two or more persons who injured or oppressed
another individual "in any matter affecting life, liberty or the pursuit of happiness. ' 71 Despite such bold assertions of plenary authority, some federal judges fretted over the limitless scope of
72
federal jurisdiction and potential clashes with that of the states.
The plenary nature of federal civil rights statutes thus posed
troublesome questions of federal jurisdiction. Prosecutors had to
draft indictments, and federal judges had to develope legal theories
of jurisdiction over these crimes, that avoided federal law supplanting state criminal law and eliminating state jurisdiction over
the administration of criminal justice. Justice Department lawyers
68. See, e.g., Letter from E.P. Jacobson, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to Amos T. Akerman,
U.S. Att'y Gen. (Aug. 4, 1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14
(S.D. Miss.); Letter from E.P. Jacobson, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S.
Att'y Gen. (Aug. 7, 1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (S.D.
Miss.); Letter from E.P. Jacobson, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to George H. Williams, U.S.
Att'y Gen. (Feb. 17, 1872), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N.D.
Miss.); Letter from G. 'WileyWells, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to George H. Williams, U.S.
Att'y Gen. (Mar. 5, 1872), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N.D.
Miss.); Letter from G. Wiley Wells, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to George H. Williams, U.S.
Att'y Gen. (Apr. 2, 1872), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N.D.
Miss.); See also KACZOROWSKI, supra note 3, at 117-20.
69. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 3, at 1-25, 117-34. See, Kaczorowski, Revolutionary
Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
863 (1986) (explaining that the interpretation of Congress' authority to enforce fundamental rights expressed by federal judges essentially reflected that of the congressional framers of the Fourteenth Amendment).
70. Charge to Grand Jury, HUNTSVILLE ADVOCATE, Nov. 12, 1871 (enclosed in
Letter from Richard Busteed, U.S. Dist. Judge, Ala., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y
Gen. (Nov. 22, 1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N.D. Ala)).
71. ld. See also Charge to GrandJury, (enclosed in Letter frori W'lliam J. Promis
to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Aug. 16, 1871) in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL
FILE, supra note 14 (N.D. Ala)).
72. See, e.g., Letter from Robert A. Hill, U.S. Dist. Judge, Miss., to Benjamin Bristow, Solicitor Gen. (May 13, 1872), in BRIsTOW PAPERS, Library of Congress [hereinafter BRIsToW PAPERS].
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sometimes turned to President Grant's Attorney General for help
in resolving these thorny jurisdictional problems. One federal
prosecutor, for example, was troubled with the strategy he devised
for distinguishing the federal crime of assault with intent to deprive
the victim of his constitutionally protected right to life from the
state crime of assault with intent to kill. 73 His solution was to allege racial or political prejudice as an additional motive, but he was
uncertain whether this sufficiently distinguished the federal crime
from the state crime.74 Attorney General Akerman responded
supportively, but not informatively. He simply encouraged the
prosecutor to try it and see if it worked. "A few experiments will
demonstrate where the dangers are," Akerman suggested.7 5 It
worked.' 6

IH. The Federal Judiciary
The enormous expansion of federal court dockets following the
Civil War hindered the efficiency of federal judges trying Klan
prosecutions.77 One of the little known consequences of the Civil
War and Reconstruction was the enormous expansion of the federal court dockets. The increase in the business of the federal
courts was due to the revenue laws and the civil rights statutes. 78
By 1871, Attorney General Akerman confided to a friend: '"I am
on the rack from morning till night, and frequently far into the
night, and yet, with all that, I can hardly keep down this pile of
business." 79 He explained that, in addition to the great increase in
federal jurisdiction, many litigants did not trust the state courts as
they had before the Civil War and that they used the federal courts
whenever they could. 0
73. Letter from E.P. Jacobson, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y
Gen. (Aug. 4, 1871), inSOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (S.D. Miss.).
74. Letter from E.P. Jacobson, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y
Gen. (Aug. 7, 1871), inSOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (S.D. Miss.).
75. Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen., to E.P. Jacobson, U.S. Att'y,
Miss. (Aug. 16, 1871), Instruction Book B2, at 324, reel 2, in INSTRUcrONS, supra
note 33.
76. Letter from Robert A. Hill, U.S. Dist. Judge, Miss., to Benjamin Bristow, Solicitor Gen. (May 13, 1872), in BRISTOW PAPERS, supra note 72.
77. KACZOROWSKI,supra note 3, at 60.
78. Id

79. Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen., to E.P. Jacobson, U.S. Att'y,
Miss. (Aug. 21, 1871), 1 Letterbooks 47-49, in AKERMAN PAPERS, supra note 24.
80. Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen., to James Jackson (Nov. 20,
1871), 1 Letterbooks 149-60, in AKERMAN PAPERS, supra note 24; Letter from Amos

T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen., to B.D. Silliman (Nov. 9, 1871), 1 Letterbooks 90-93, in
AKERMAN PAPERS, supra note 24.
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The situation was no better for the federal judges who tried Klan
prosecutions. Like Justice Department attorneys, federal judges
struggled to perform their duties without sufficient assistance.
They did not have law clerks and secretaries as federal judges do
today. Even more serious than the lack of clerical help, they sometimes did not even have a legal library or copies of federal statutes. 81 Understandably, docket backlogs developed that would
have made Federal Judge I. Leo Glasser of the Eastern District of
New York look efficient. Judge Glasser's docket backlog in 1995 of
55 civil cases recently made the front page of The New York
Times.82 On his first visit to the United States Court at Memphis,
Tennessee, in 1870, newly appointed Circuit Court Judge Halmer
Emmons discovered that it was encumbered with a docket of some
400 cases, many of which were years in arrears. He regarded some
of these cases to be "of the highest national as well as local importance."8 3 Characterizing the situation there as "simply disgraceful," he concluded that "the administration of Federal law has been
practically suspended" in Memphis.
/
Another problem faced by federal judges, as well as prosecutors,
was the racial and class character of Klan prosecutions, which undermined the legitimacy of the federal courts in the South. Defendants were always white and frequently men of wealth and
influence. Victims were usually black and of a lower socio-economic status. White racism and class bias undermined the credibility of government witnesses. Even when jurors were willing to
convict, federal attorneys were confronted with the challenge of
persuading them to credit the testimony of persons regarded as
inferior more than that of highly respected leaders of the
85
community.
81. Letter from Halmer H. Emmons, U.S. Cir. Judge, to Amos T. Akerman, U.S.
Att'y Gen. (Nov. 28, 1870), inSOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (W.D.
Tenn.).
82. N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1995, at 1.
83. Letter from Halner H. Emmons, U.S. Cir. Judge, to Amos T. Akerman, U.S.
Att'y Gen. (Nov. 28, 1870), inSOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (W.D.
Tenn.).
84. Id
85. Letter from John A. Minnis, U.S. Att'y, Ala., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y
Gen. (Nov. 26, 1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N. & M.D.
Ala.); Letter from John A. Minnis, U.S. Att'y, Ala., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y
Gen. (Dec. 1, 1871), inSOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N. & M.D.
Ala.); MONTGOMERY STATE JOURNAL (n.d.) (clipping enclosed in Letter from John

A. Minnis, U.S. Att'y, Ala., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Dec. 28, 1871), in
SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N. & M.D. Ala.); Letter from E.P.
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Moreover, Southern Democrats condemned the federal enforcement of civil rights for sacrificing free government and personal
liberty to military despotism and executive imperialism. They
viewed the unprecedented intrusion of the federal government into
traditionally local affairs as nothing less than a revolution in American federalism. To a large extent, it was a revolution in federalism.
Nonetheless, it was the racial character of the federal government's
enforcement of civil rights as much as its supplanting of state authority that Southern Democrats and white supremacists saw as destroying their personal freedom. 86 Democratic Senator Reverdy
Johnson, for example, expressed these themes as defense attorney
in the Ku Klux Klan trials at Columbia, South Carolina: "In the
name of justice and humanity," he passionately admonished the
court, "in the name of those rights for which our fathers fought,
you cannot subject the white man to the absolute and7 uncondi'8
tional dominion of an armed force of a colored race.
The politically partisan nature of these trials further diminished
their legitimacy. Republicans enforced federal law, while Democrats challenged it. Federal civil rights statutes had been enacted
by Republican controlled Congresses; they were being enforced by
a Republican administration; all the prosecuting attorneys, and
many of the presiding federal judges, had been appointed by Republican presidents. In contrast, the Ku Klux Klan was an instrument of the Democratic Party. 8 The Klan was dedicated to the
causes of white supremacy and the destruction of the Republican
Party's influence in the South. Consequently, federal prosecutions
were almost always brought against white Democrats to protect
Republicans, usually black Republicans. 89 This political context
Jacobson, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Sept. 13, 1871), in
SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (S.D. Miss.).
86. CHARLESTON DAILY COURIER, Apr. 25, 1871, at 4; CHARLESTON DAILY COU-

RIER, Sept. 6, 1871, at 2; CHARLESTON DAILY COURIER, Oct. 26, 1871, at 2; CHARLES-

TON DAILY COURIER, Nov. 25, 1871, at 1; CHARLESTON DAILY COURIER, Nov. 27,

1871, at 2; CHARLESTON DAILY COURIER, Dec. 13, 1871, at 4; See NEW YORK EVE-

NING POST, NEW YORK JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, AND WILMINGTON JOURNAL editorials reprinted in CHARLES-

Apr. 25, 1871.
87. CHARLESTON DAILY COURIER, Dec. 13, 1871, at 4; see CHARLESTON DAILY

TON DAILY COURIER,
COURIER,

Sept. 6, 1871, at 2 (showing that Senator James Doolittle made the same

argument).
88. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 3, at 62.
89. Letter from William J. Promis to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Aug. 16,
1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N. & M.D. Ala.); Letter

from Daniel T. Corbin, U.S. Att'y, S.C., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Dec.
3, 1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (S.C.). See e.g., Letter
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led many Southerners to perceive the federal courts as agents of
the Republican Party rather than neutral arbiters of justice.
The fact that jurors in federal civil rights prosecutions were selected on the basis of their race or party affiliation added to the
deligitimization of the federal courts. This selection practice resulted from the bitter experience of federal prosecutors. Justice
Department attorneys quickly learned that if Democrats, who were
always White, served on grand juries, prosecutors would fail to gain
indictments. When Democrats served on petit juries, defendants
were not convicted, no matter how overwhelming the evidence of
their guilt. Thus, political and racial prejudice imposed a Hobson's
choice on federal authorities with regard to the appearence of impartiality in the administration of justice. On the one hand, impanelment of all eligible jurors was necessary to maintain the
appearence of impartiality. On the other hand, the only possibility
of obtaining indictments and convictions when the evidence warranted them was to limit juries to Republicans and blacks by excluding Democrats. Consequently, federal juries invariably
consisted of white and black Republicans, with blacks sometimes
outnumbering whites. Southern Democrats interpreted the racial
and political composition of federal juries as incontrovertable evidence of political persecution through judicial injustice.90
The appearence of partisanship was enhanced by the activities of
federal marshalls and attorneys who openly campaigned for Republican candidates for national, state and local offices. 91 Moreover, political connections, if not affiliations, were critical to
obtaining and retaining federal office. Justice Department lawyers
continually reassured the Attorney General of their political loyfrom Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen., to McWharton (Nov. 16, 1871), 1 Letterbooks 134-36, in AKERMAN PAPERS, supra note 24 (showing the partisan character
of Southern violence was a recurring theme in Attorney General Akerman's personal
correspondence).
90. Letter from J.H. Pierce, U.S. Marshal, to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen.
(Aug. 21, 1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N.D. Miss.); Letter
from Hugh Lennox Bond, U.S. Cir. Judge, N.C., to Anna Bond (Nov. 26, 1871), in

supra note 12; CHARLESTON DAILY COURIER, Sept. 27, 1871, at 4;
Nov. 27, 1871, at 2; CHARLESTON DAILY COURIER,
Nov. 29, 1871, at 4; CHARLESTON DAILY COURIER, Dec. 2, 1871, at 1; CHARLESTON
DAILY COURIER, Dec. 4, 1871, at 1; CHARLESTON DAILY COURIER, Dec. 14, 1871, at
2; NEW YORK WORLD, Dec. 26, 1871, reprinted in CHARLESTON DAILY COURIER, Jan.
4, 1872, at 4.
91. Such campaigning was facilitated because codes of professional responsibility
BOND PAPERS,

CHARLESTON DAILY COURIER,

in the nineteenth century were much more permissive regarding the political activities
of federal legal officers than they are today.
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alty. 92 Some federal lawyers were so dismayed with the extent to
permeated federal office that they expressed a desire
which politics
93
resign.
to
Some federal judges were blatantly political. For example, the
United States District Judge for the District of Virginia, John Un94
derwood, was notorious for his Radical Republican partisanship.
On the other hand, United States District Judge for the District of
South Carolina, George S. Bryan, was an equally partisan Southern
Democrat. United States Circuit Judge Hugh Lennox Bond was
convinced that Judge Bryan was obstructing the Ku Klux Klan trials in South Carolina at the urging of Democratic leaders who apparently had promised Judge Bryan the South Carolina
governorship. Judge Bond believed that the "democrats have hold
of [Bryan]

.

step."' 95

. & persuade him to be a stick between our legs at

Bond confided to his wife that he was so fed up with
every
Bryan that he "went to him the other day & frightened him half to
death. I stormed at him," Bond informed her, "&told him, if he
wanted his salary increased (you know he is always talking about
that) he had just better [not] keep the court sitting doing nothing
96
but posing about the smallest matter in the world day after day."
Although Bond succeeded in frightening Bryan, he added that "I
am sick of him & altogether disgusted & he is with me."' 97 They
disagreed in their interpretations of the scope of federal civil rights
enforcement authority and sent one of the first cases to the United
92. Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen., to Foster Blodgett (Nov. 8,
1871), 1 Letterbooks 203-05, in AKERmAN PAPERS, supra note 24; Letter from Amos
T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen., to B.D. Silliman (Nov. 9, 1871), 1 Letterbooks 90-93,
in AKERMAN PAPERS, supra note 24; Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y
Gen., to James Atkins (Nov. 29, 1871), 1 Letterbooks 175-80, in AKERMAN PAPERS,
supra note 24; Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen., to William Marvin
(Dec. 6, 1871), 1 Letterbooks 209-12, in AKERMAN PAPERS, supra note 24; Letter
from Robert P. Dick to William L. Scott (June 15, 1870), inWILLIAM LAFAYETTE
Sco-r PAPERS, William R. Perkins Library, Duke University [hereinafter ScoTr PAPERS]; Letter from Robert P. Dick to William L. Scott (Aug. 24, 1870), in ScoTr PAPERS supra; Letter from Robert P. Dick to William L. Scott (July 21, 1871), in ScoTr
PAPERS supra; Letter from Robert P. Dick to William L. Scott (July 4, 1872), in Scorr
PAPERS supra; Letter from Alphonse Taft to Edwards Pierrepont (Nov. 17, 1870), in
EDWARDS PIERREPONT PAPERS, University of Iowa (reflecting the partisanship of

federal legal officers).
93. Letter from Benjamin H. Bristow, U.S. Att'y, Ky., to his mother (Sept. 20,
1869), in BENJAMIN H. BRISTOW PAPERS, The Filson Club, Louisville, Ky.
94. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 3, at 66.
95. Letter from Hugh Lennox Bond, U.S. Cir. Judge, N.C., to Anna Bond (n.d.),
in BOND PAPERS, supra note 12.
96. IiL
97. Id.
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States Supreme Court which tested the constitutionality of the Jus98
tice Department's enforcement of civil rights.
Federal judges unwittingly contributed to the appearance of judicial partisanship by their conception of their role within the constitutional structure of the federal government. Federal judges did
not exercise the power of judicial review in the manner of contemporary judges, who often express a restricted notion of constitutional delegation of power to Congress. Rather, they interpreted
the provisions of the Constitution generally as delegations of legislative power, whether or not such power was expressly delegated.
They interpreted the Constitution in a nationalistic, open-ended
manner. Moreover, federal judges viewed the judiciary's institutional role as enforcing the will of Congress, nullifying a federal
statute only in those exceptional cases where it was irreconciliably

in conflict with the Constitution.
The federal judges who presided over Klan trials shared these

views.99 This judicial philosophy worked to the detriment of
Southern Democrats and white supremacists in the early 1870s because the Republican Party dominated the legislative and executive branches of the federal government. The Republican Party's
public policies in the South required the national government to
exercise broad constitutional powers. Accordingly, federal judges'
understanding of their insitutional role, their nationalistic, broad
interpretation of the Constitution, and their corresponding acceptance of Congress' plenary authority to enforce citizens' rights,
when applied to the civil rights enforcement statutes, was seen to
be motivated by partisan objectives.
Naturally enough, the Democratic Party championed a different
theory of judicial review and a more resticted interpretation of
98. United States v. Avery, 80 U.S. 251 (1871); Letter from Daniel T. Corbin, U.S.
Att'y, S.C., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Nov. 17, 1871), in SOURCE
CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (S.C.); Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S.
Att'y Gen., to Daniel T. Corbin U.S. Att'y, S.C. (Dec. 6, 1871), 1 Letterbooks 203-05,
in AKERMAN PAPERS, supra note 24; N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1871, at 1. The proceedings in the South CarolinaKu Klux Klan Thals were published in PROCEEDINGS IN
THE Ku KLUX KLAN TRIALS 'AT COLUMBIA, S.C. IN THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT

COURT, NOVEMBER TERM, 1871 (1872).

99. See Charge to GrandJury, (enclosed in letter from Robert A. Hill, U.S. Dist.
Judge, Miss., to Benjamin H. Bristow, Solicitor Gen. (July 28, 1871), in SOURCE
CHRONOLOoICAL FILE, supra note 14 (S.D. Miss.)); Letter from Robert A. Hill, U.S.
Dist. Judge, Miss., to Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase (Aug. 16, 1868) (box 7), in
SALMON P. CHASE PAPERS, Historical Society of Pennsylvania; Charge to Grand Jury,
HUNTSVILLE .ADVOCATE, Nov. 12, 1871 (enclosed in letter from Richard Busteed,
U.S. Dist. Judge, Ala., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Nov. 22, 1871), in
SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N. & M.D. Ala.)).
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Congress' power to enforce rights. Democratic Party leaders, and
defense attorneys, interpreted the Constitution and Congress' legislative powers under it in a restricted state-rights-centered manner. They demanded that the federal courts assert their power of
judicial review to void federal civil rights enforcement statutes on
the theory that these statutes exceeded the powers the Constitution
delegated to Congress and usurped the sovereignty the Constitution reserved to the states. Judicial philosophy and constitutional
interpretation became so partisan that judges, lawyers and the general public referred to conflicting theories either as Republican or
Democratic. 100 The coincidence of legislative and executive power
with constitutional theory and conceptions of the judiciary's role
made it impossible for federal courts both to dispense, and to be
perceived as dispensing, neutral justice.
Federal judges during Reconstruction experienced even greater
dangers than those who presided over desegregation in the South
during the 1950s and 1960s.101 "Sometimes the Ku Klux in the peo-

ple will break out," Deputy Marshall Allen P. Huggins informed
Attorney General Akerman from Mississippi in 1871, "and the
Court is so completely overawed that I do not see much chance for
justice to be meted out to these fiends in human shape." 1°2 The
Attorney General observed that Mississippi was "not the only
district where
the judiciary succumbs to the pressure of a local
' 10 3
sentiment.
IV.

National Politics and the Waning of Federal Civil Rights
Enforcement

Opposition to federal prosecutions of Klansmen was not restricted to the South. Democrats in the North also denied that the
Klan existed and complained that reports of Klan terrorism were
100. The association between party and judicial philosophy was widely noted. Letter from John A. Minnis, U.S. Att'y, Ala., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen.
(Dec. 1, 1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N. & M.D. Ala.);
Senator James Doolittle, Speech in Charleston Daily Courier, Sept. 6, 1871, at 2; Senator Allan Thurman, Speech in Charleston Daily Courier, Sept. 11, 1871, at 2; Congressman Grosbeck, Speech in Charleston Daily Courier, Sept. 18, 1871, at 2;
CHARLESTON DAILY COURIER, Sept. 19, 1871, at 2.
101. See J. PELTASON, FiFrY-EiGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES
AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1971) (chronicling the dangers faced by federal
judges presiding over desegration efforts).
102. Letter from Allen P. Huggins to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen. (June 28,
1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N.D. Miss.).
103. Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen., to E.P. Jacobson, U.S. Att'y,
Ala. (Aug. 18, 1871), 1 Letterbooks 44-46, in AKERMAN PAPERS, supra note 24.
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fabricated by President Grant and the Republicans. 104 Thus, administration officials were forced to divert resources and energy to
convince an increasingly skeptical public that the Klan did exist
and that federal prosecutions of civil rights violators were not partisan persecutions of Southerners lawfully opposing Republican
policies. Indeed, the Attorney General tried10 5to use these prosecutions to expose the criminality of the Klan.
Skepticism about the Klan's existence, as well as the manner and
extent of fiscal expenditures used to prosecute the Klan, exposed
the Grant Administration to charges of using the coercive power of
government for partisan and venal ends. Justice Department lawyers were paid by the number of cases they brought. Witnesses
were given per diem and travel expenses. The more cases that
prosecutors brought, the more income they earned. The more witnesses they called, the greater the alleged patronage. Democrats
accused federal legal officers of. using civil rights prosecutions as
pretexts for their own political and economic self-interest.1°6 Judge
Bond estimated the costs of the month-long South Carolina Klan
trials in 1871 to be the "fearful" sum of $200 per hour. Although
over 400 defendants were scheduled for trial, Judge Bond was able
to try only five. 0 7
About three-quarters of the Ku Klux Klan prosecutions re-

mained untried throughout the South at the end of 1871. The

number of defendants awaiting trial in North and South Carolina
alone numbered some 1,350.108 Referring to the backlog of cases

in South Carolina, Attorney General Akerman lamented in his an104. Letter from John A. Minnis, U.S. Att'y, Ala., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y
Gen. (Dec. 1, 1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N. & M.D.
Ala.); Letter from John A. Minnis, U.S. Att'y, Ala., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y
Gen. (Dec. 28, 1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N. & M.D.
Ala.); Letter from Hugh Lennox Bond, U.S. Cir. Judge. N.C., to Anna Bond (Sept.
28, 1871), inBOND PAPERS, supra note 12; N.Y. TIMEs, July 26, 1870, at 4; N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 1871, at 4.
105. Letter from Robert A. Hill, U.S. Dist. Judge, Miss., to Benjamin H. Bristow,
Solicitor Gen. (July 28, 1871), in Source Chronological File, supra note 14 (S.D.,
Miss.).
106. Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen., to James R. Beckwith, U.S.
Att'y, La. (Jan. 5, 1872), Instruction Book C, at 137, reel 3, in INSTRUCrIONS, supra

note 33; Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen., to Stephen B. Packard, U.S.
Marshal, New Orleans, La. (Jan. 6, 1872), Instruction Book C, at 137-38, in INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 33; H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 6, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1872); S.
EXEC. Doc. No. 32, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 7 (1873) [hereinafter S. EXEC. Doc. No. 32].
107. Letter from Hugh Lennox Bond, U.S. Cir. Judge, N.C., to Anna Bond (Sept.
27, 1871), in BOND PAPERS, supra note 12.
108. H*R. EXEC. Doc. No. 55, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 [hereinafter H.R. EXEC.
Doc. No. 55]; S.EXEC. Doc. No. 32, supra note 106, at 10-11.
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nual report, "it is obvious that the attempt to bring to justice ...
even a small portion of the guilty ...must fail, or the judicial machinery of the United States must be increased. If it takes a court
over one month to try five offenders, how long will it take to try
four hundred, already indicted,
and many hundreds more who de0 9
serve to be indicted?'
It soon became apparent to federal legal officers that they would
never be able to prosecute every one of the hundreds of accused
criminals awaiting trial. This awareness demoralized even those
federal legal officers and judges, such as Judge Bond and Attorney
General Akerman, who were the most deeply committed to enforcing federal civil rights law. The Klan prosecutions that Judge
Bond tried in North and South Carolina in 1871 wore him down.
When these trials began in June, he boldly proclaimed to his wife
that "I am going to stay here and fight Ku Klux if it takes all summer." 110 By September he revealed the strain these cases imposed
on him when he plaintively wished for some governmental policy
that would merely put an end to Klan atrocities. "I am only anxious to devise a method to do so, for all I want is an acknowledgement of its existence & of its nefarious character-that it is
suppressed.""' By December, after the month-long trial of 5 defendants out of 420 awaiting trial at Columbia, South Carolina, he
feared that, "if we go on this way it will take till the next Presidential election to clean them out.""12 Although discouraged, Judge
Bond remained determined: "If all the defense try here is my patience, I shall see that it don't avail. I shall stay them out if it costs
3
me my life.""1
Under these circumstances, it was not surprising that Attorney
General Akerman began to think that the Ku Klux Klan was "too
much even for the United States to undertake to inflict adequate
penalties through the courts. 1" 4 He did not expect Congress to
provide the requisite funding or legal and judicial administrative
staffing. "The feeling here [in Washington, D.C.]," he informed a
109. H.R. EXEc. Doc. No. 55, supra note 108, at 5.
110. Letter from Hugh Lennox Bond, U.S. Cir. Judge, N.C., to Anna Bond (n.d.),
inBOND PAPERS, supra note 12.
111. Letter from Hugh Lennox Bond, U.S. Cir. Judge, N.C., to Anna Bond (Sept.
28, 1871), in BOND PAPERS, supra note 12.
112. Letter from Hugh Lennox Bond, U.S. Cir. Judge, N.C., to Anna Bond (Dec.
18, 1871), inBOND PAPERS, supra note 12.
113. Id.
114. Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen., to James Jackson (Nov. 20,
1871), 1 Letterbooks 149-60, in AKERMAN PAPERS, supra note 24.

178

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII

confidant, "is very strong that the Southern republicans must cease
to look for special support to congressional action." 115 Not only
was this policy perceived to be an unjustly partisan administration
of federal law, it also smacked of political corruption. Critics attacked the President for venal partisanship, extravagance, waste
and military despotism." 6 The President responded by making the
reduction 7of government expenses and the public debt high
priorities."
Amnesty to Southerners and restoration of home rule was gaining support even among the leaders and rank-and-file members of
the President's party. Akerman observed that Northerners were
simply losing interest in Reconstruction: "The Northern mind being active and full of what is called progress, runs away from the
past." ' 8 Having suffered as a Republican in his native state of
Georgia, Akerman fearfully asserted, "My apprehension is that
they are not aware that the Southern people are still untaught in
the elements of the Republican creed.""' 9 Under these political
conditions, Akerman concluded, "Congress will be indisposed to
make any changes in the national courts that would secure their
efficiency in suppressing this conspiracy."' 20 By the end of 1871,
Grant's Attorney General was forced to acknowledge the utter inadequacy of the federal courts to protect citizens from Klan violence. He mused to a friend "whether, if in 1867, I had forseen the
strength of the prejudices to be encountered, I should have had the
courage to enter the field on this side, which I believed both expedient and right.'' z However, "having entered," he "was not disposed to recede," though he was "hard pressed" by adversaries,
"and sometimes sorely tried by those whom the necessities of the
case made my comrades.' 22
Acknowledging the impossibility of prosecuting every reported
civil rights violation, the administration reluctantly reduced its expectations and cautiously changed its policy. Akerman instructed
federal prosecutors to be more selective in the prosecutions they
115. Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen., to J.R. Parrot (Dec. 6, 1871),
1 Letterbooks 213-20, in AIERMAN PAPERS, supra note 24.
116. FOrNnR, supra note 4, at 512-24.
117. GILLE'TE, supra note 5, at 166-85; FONER, supra note 4, at 512-28.
118. Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen., to Benjamin Conley (Dec.
28, 1871), 1 Letterbooks 272-77, in AKERMAN PAPERS, supra note 24.
119. Id
120. Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen., to James Jackson (Nov. 20,
1871), 1 Letterbooks 149-60, in AKERMAN PAPERS, supra note 24.
121. Id.
122. Id
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brought.123 They were to go after ring leaders and those who actively participated in "acts of deep criminality." Defendants who
played lesser roles or who committed less egregious offenses were
to be bailed and tried later. Others who were unwilling participants in nonviolent crimes and who demonstrated. "penitence for
their offenses, and a determination to abstain from such crimes in
if they confessed and were
the future" could be spared1 punishment
"good citizens henceforth.' 24
Akerman cautiously experimented with this new policy of selective prosecution in South Carolina. He feared that any sign of a
weakening commitment on the part of the administration to protect citizens in the South would be interpreted as a capitulation to
terrorism that would only invite more violence. "As long as these
bad men believe you are unable to protect yourselves," he confided
to a federal marshall in South Carolina,, "they will cherish the purpose of injurying you as soon as the hand of the Government shall
be withdrawn." 25
Heeding this advice, federal prosecutors actually increased the
•number of prosecutions they brought and disposed of in 1872.126
127
They were buoyed by the effect they were having on the Klan.
At the beginning of 1872, they believed they were on the verge of
destroying the Klan. They were restoring peace in many Southern
Klan strongholds. Klansmen spared prosecutors the time and expense of trials by confessing their crimes in return for leniency in
their punishments. "They all plead guilty," Judge Bond informed
his wife, "If only you won't hang them."'12 In South Carolina,
Klan leaders
reportedly ordered Klansmen to cease all violence in
129
the state.
Notwithstanding impossible conditions in the field, insufficient
financial and human resources, a penurious Congress, and the Jus123. Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen., to Daniel T. Corbin, U.S.
Att'y, S.C. (Nov. 10, 1871), Instruction Book C, at 28-30, reel 3, in INSTRUCrIONS,
supra note 33.
124. ld
125. Letter from Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y Gen., to Charles Prossner (Nov. 9,
1871), in 1 LETrERS

SENT BY DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: GENERAL AND MISCELLANE-

ous, 1818-1904, 91 Vols., at 127-8, microfilm copy, reel 14, National Archives [hereinafter MISCELLANEOUS LETrERS SENT].
126. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 3, at 103.
127. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 3, at 93.

128. Letter from Hugh Lennox Bond, U.S. Cir. Judge, N.C., to Anna Bond (April
14, 1872), in BOND PAPERS, supra note 12.
129. Letter from Hugh Lennox Bond, U.S. Cir. Judge, N.C., to Anna Bond (April
11, 1872), in BOND PAPERS, supra note 12.
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tice Department's adoption of the policy of selective prosecution,
federal prosecutors were still able to report in 1872 that the Justice
Department was winning its war against the Klan. The department's demonstrated determination to prosecute terrorists was
"demoralizing and carrying terror to these lawless K.K.Klans," the
United States attorney reported from Alabama. 130 It was the government's determination to punish wrongdoers as much as the success of selective prosecutions and convictions that struck terror in
the hearts of Klansmen. "We have broken up Ku Klux in North
Carolina," Judge Bond gleefully reported to his wife. "Everybody
now wants to confess & we are picking out the top puppies only for
32
trial."13' The Klan ceased operating in South Carolina as well.'
Although federal legal officers successfully suppressed the Klan
through federal legal process, Klan-like terrorism was not completely eradicated. 33 Federal attorneys believed that the Justice
Department had to continue vigorously prosecuting terrorists if
peace were to be made permanent. They warned the Attorney
General that any weakening in the Justice Department's resolve
would renew violence. Federal attorneys admonished the Attorney General that the vigorous enforcement of federal civil rights
laws was essential to preserve the peace. United States Attorney
G. Wiley Wells reported that the Klan in his District of Northern
Mississippi was merely biding its time until the federal government
eased its prosecutions. 34 United States Attorney for the District
of South Carolina Daniel T. Corbin predicted an orgy of terror in
his state if the government faltered in its determination to bring
civil rights violators to justice. 135 The United States attorney for
130. Letter from John A. Minnis, U.S. Att'y, Ala., to George H. Williams, U.S.
Att'y Gen. (June 25, 1872), inSOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N. &
M.D. Ala.). See also Letter from John A. Minnis, U.S. Att'y, Ala., to George H.
Williams, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Apr. 1, 1872), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra
note 14 (N. & M.D. Ala.).
131. Letter from Hugh Lennox Bond, U.S. Cir. Judge, N.C., to Anna Bond (Sept.
21, 1871), inBOND PAPERS, supra note 12.
132. Letter from Hugh Lennox Bond, U.S. Cir. Judge, N.C., to Anna Bond (Apr.
11, 1872), inBOND PAPERS, supra note 12; Letter from Hugh Lennox Bond, U.S. Cir.
Judge, N.C., to Anna Bond (Apr. 14, 1872), inBOND PAPERS, supra note 12.
133. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 3, at 94.
134. Letter from G. Wiley Wells, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to George H. Wiliams, U.S.
Att'y Gen. (Apr. 2, 1872), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (S.D.
Miss.); Letter from G. Wiley Wells, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to George H. Williams, U.S.
Att'y Gen. (July 8, 1872), inSOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (S.D.
Miss.).
135. Letter from Daniel T. Corbin, U.S. Att'y, S.C., to George H. Williams, U.S.
Att'y Gen. (July 22, 1872), inSOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (S.C.).
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the District of Alabama feared that the Klan would interpret a failure of the Republican Party to renominate President Grant in 1872
as a weakening of resolve to enforce civil rights that "would revive
their hopes and encourage new outrages.' 1 36 Judge Bond reported
from South Carolina that, if the government curtailed its civil rights
enforcement, he "would not live in this State 24 hours if I were a
37
republican.'
The optimism engendered by federal convictions of Klansmen
thus rested on a tenuous basis. The Justice Department's success in
suppressing the Klan notwithstanding, violence and intimidation
driven by racism and local prejudice continued to be used as instruments of political action. Southern apologists persisted in their
support of the Klan, and Southern white supremacists continued to
oppose and impede federal legal officers who valiantly struggled to
enforce federal laws. Rather than conceding the criminality of Ku
Klux violence, Southern Democrats praised the Klan as defenders
of Southern rights against the violence they claimed was caused by
federal interference in local affairs, and they excoriated federal officials for martyring their heroes in judicial "persecutions.' 38 The
surest way to restore peace, they insisted, was to end federal interference in the South and to return the administration of criminal
justice to the people of the South. 139 Even Southerners who acknowledged and condemned Klan violence expressed the belief
that lawlessness was instigated by the enforcement of federal civil
rights laws, and they demanded that the federal government cease
its intrusions into Southern life. 140
136. Letter from John A. Minnis, U.S. Att'y, Ala., to Amos T. Akerman, U.S. Att'y

Gen. (Dec. 28, 1871), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N. & M.D.

Ala). See also Letter from John A. Minnis, U.S. Att'y, Ala., to George H. Williams,
U.S. Att'y Gen. (Apr. 1, 1872), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N.
& M.D. Ala.).
137. Letter from Hugh Lennox Bond, U.S. Cir. Judge, N.C., to Anna Bond (Apr.
14, 1872), inBOND PAPERS, supra note 12.
138. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 3, at 95.
139. Id
140. Letter from John A. Minnis, U.S. Att'y, Ala., to George H. Williams, U.S.
Att'y Gen. (Jan. 10, 1872), inSOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N. &
M.D. Ala.); Letter from John A. Minnis, U.S. Att'y, Ala., to George H. Williams, U.S.
Att'y Gen. (Apr. 1, 1872), inSOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N. &
M.D. Ala.); Letter from John A. Minnis, U.S. Att'y, Ala., to George H. Williams, U.S.
Att'y Gen. (June 25, 1872), inSOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N. &
M.D. Ala.); Letter from Richard Busteed, U.S. Dist. Judge, Ala., to George H. Williams, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Mar. 29, 1872), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note
14 (N. & M.D. Ala.); Letter from D. Lewis, to George H. Williams, U.S. Att'y Gen.
(July 7, 1872), inSOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N. & M.D. Ala.);
Letter from R.W. Healy, U.S. Marshall, Ala., to George H. Williams, U.S. Att'y Gen.
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At the end of 1871, President Grant replaced Attorney General
Akerman with George H. Williams for reasons unrelated to the
administration's civil rights enforcement policies.141 Williams continued Akerman's policies through the spring of 1873. From this

time onward, however, inadequate appropriations rendered effective enforcement of federal civil rights laws impossible. Unable to
squeeze sufficient funds from Congress, the Administration was
forced to curtail its civil rights enforcement policy. 142 Attorney
General Williams signalled a policy change in September 1872 in
response to a request for clemency by Alexander H. Stephens, the
former Vice-President of the Confederate States of America:
"When the President is satisfied that the danger from Ku Klux violence has ceased and that such unlawful associations have been
abandoned, he will be ready to exercise executive clemency in all
1' 43
cases in the most liberal manner.'
The most peaceful national election during the Reconstruction
era occurred in 1872." President Grant responded by having Attorney General Williams instruct federal prosecutors in June 1873
"to suspend these prosecutions except in some of the worst
cases."' 145 It was his hope that this policy would "produce obedi(Feb. 26, 1872), inSOURCE

CHRONOLOGICAL FILE,

supra note 14 (N. & M.D. Ala.);

Letter from Robert A. Hill, U.S. Dist. Judge, Miss., to George H. Williams, U.S. Att'y
Gen. (Jan. 10, 1872), in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N.D. Miss.);
Letter from G. Wiley Wells, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to George H. Williams, U.S. Att'y Gen.
(Jan 16, 1872), inSOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (S.D. Miss.); Letter
from G. Wiley Wells, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to George H. Williams, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Feb.

21, 1872), inSOURCE

CHRONOLOGICAL FILE,

supra note 14 (S.D. Miss.); Letter from

G. Wiley Wells, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to George H. Williams, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Mar. 4,
1872), inSOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (S.D. Miss.); Letter from G.
Wiley Wells, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to George H. Williams, U.S. Att'y Gen. (Mar. 9, 1872),
in SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note

14 (S.D. Miss.); Letter from G. Wiley

Wells, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to George H. Williams, U.S. Att'y Gen. (July 8, 1872), in
SOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note
141. FONER, supra note 4, at 458.
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142. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 3, at 101-08.
143. Letter from Major Lewis Merrill to George H. Williams, U.S. Att'y Gen.

(Sept. 30, 1872), inSOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (S.C.) (upon hearing of Stephen's clemency request: the Army officer in charge of peacekeeping in
South Carolina urged the Attorney General to reject it out of fear that extending
clemency to terrorists would simply encourage them to embark on a rampage of
terror).
144. Letter from John A. Minnis, U.S. Att'y, Ala., to George H. Williams, U.S.
Att'y Gen. (July 18, 1873), inSOURCE CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, supra note 14 (N. &
M.D. Ala.); Letter from E.P. Jacobson, U.S. Att'y, Miss., to George H. Williams, U.S.
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1873), Instruction Book D, at 91, reel 4, in INSTRUCrIONS, supra note 33.
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ence to the law, and quiet and peace among the people."' 46 A delegation of Southern leaders, with a letter of introduction from
Federal Judge George F. Bryan of South Carolina, visited the President one month later at his summer house in Long Branch, New
Jersey. They requested clemency for Klansmen who had been convicted of violating federal civil rights laws. President Grant acceded to their request in return for assurances that the Klan had
been broken up, that Klansmen and their sympathizers had "come
to see the folly, wickedness and danger of such organizations" and
that peace would be preserved. 147
In the summer of 1873, therefore, Attorney General Williams
informed Justice Department lawyers that they were not to prosecute violators of federal civil rights laws.1a The President and his
Attorney General apparently accepted the arguments of
Southerners who insisted that law enforcement bred crime and that
the failure to enforce the law would produce peace, law and order.
The Grant administration thus abandoned civil rights enforcement
despite the warnings of federal legal officers that leniency would
invite a resumption of crime and violence. 49 Political opposition
within their own party and the economic crisis that began in 1873
made the President and his Attorney General more susceptible to
the entreaties of Southerners than to the warnings of their legal
50
officers. The administration felt compelled to cut expenses.
Even Northern opinion opposed federal interference in Southern
affairs and regarded it as evidence of the administration's despotic,
corrupt, and wasteful policies. The new civil rights policy of nonenforcement was an effective way to rebut these charges, to alleviate financial crisis and to satisfy shifting political sentiment. It enabled the administration to give up power, to curtail government
operations, and to reduce government spending. Moreover, it contributed to a restoration of peace with the South.
Although the Grant Administration had succeeded in subduing
the first organized uprising by the Ku Klux Klan, violence soon reerupted. However, when federal prosecutors tried to bring terrorists to justice in 1874, federal judges ruled that they did not have
146. Id.
147. Letter from George S. Bryan, U.S. Dist. Judge, S.C., to George H. Williams,
U.S. Att'y Gen. (n.d.) (enclosed in Letter from W. Porter, J. Kershaw, and R. Sims, to
George H. Williams, U.S. Att'y Gen. (July 31, 1873), in MISCELLANEOUS LErTERS
SENT, supra note 125, vol. K, at 40-41).
148. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 3, at 111.
149. See supra notes 111-14.
150. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 3, at 108.
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the constitutional authority to try them. An 1873 decision by the
United States Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House Cases indirectly had cast doubt on the constitutionality of federal criminal
civil rights statutes. 15 1 In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court
narrowly construed the protection afforded by the Fourteenth
Amendment. It ruled that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
protected only rights derived from national citizenship, such as the
right to petition Congress, use of the nation's navigable water and
the right to interstate travel. Moreover, the Court found that the
Due Process Clause simply ensured that state laws would be enacted in accordance with lawfully established procedures. In addition, the Court concluded that the Equal Protection Clause was
intended solely to protect blacks from racially discriminatory state
action.
Then, in 1874, several federal judges ruled that federal civil
rights statutes were unconstitutional.152 Federal legal officers suspended civil rights enforcement until the Supreme Court explicitly
decided the scope of the federal government's authority over civil
rights.' 3 The Court effectively resolved the issue in 1875 in United
States v. Cruikshank and United States v. Reese, where it declared
certain sections of the acts to be unconstitutional. 54 In Cruikshank, the Court held that federal criminal indictments obtained
under the Act of May 31, 1870 (the Enforcement Act) for killing
blacks was unconstitutional because the accused persons were not
state actors and were not violating rights derived from national citizenship. In contrast, in Reese the Court ruled that indictments obtained against registrars of election under the Act of May 31, 1870
for denying a black man the right to vote in a municipal election
were unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that, while the Fifteenth Amendment authorized Congress to enact legislation protecting the voting rights of blacks against racially discriminatory
state action, the Act's broad wording was not limited to state action. It could be construed as applying also to the actions of private individuals. The Court refused to place a limiting construction
151. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
152. United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F.Cas. 707 (C.C. La. 1874) (No. 14,897); Texas
v. Gaines, 23 F.Cas. 869 (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1874) (No. 13,847).
153. Letter from George H. Williams, U.S. Att'y Gen., to James R. Beckwith, U.S.
Att'y, La. (Oct. 14, 1874), Instruction Book D, at 629, reel 4, in INSTRUCnONS, supra
note 33; Letter from George H. Williams, U.S. Att'y Gen., to G. Murray (May 4,
1875), Instruction Book E, at 443-44, reel 5, in INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 33.
154. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); United States v. Reese, 92
U.S. 214 (1875).
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on the statute, reasoning that judicial redrafting would invade Congress' legislative prerogative.
The Court's decisions severely curtailed federal jurisdiction over
civil rights. Political developments in the 1870s complemented
these developments in the law as northerners consented to remove

the national government from the process of racial adjustment. By
the end of the nineteenth century, white supremacists in the South
succeeded in subjugating black Americans and they kept black
Americans in subjugation through much of the twentieth century.

Conclusion
There were enormous difficulties involved in enforcing federal
civil rights during the First Reconstruction. The problems faced by
the federal executive branch included (1) the inadequate manpower and fiscal resources suffered by the Justice Department; (2)
the legal difficulty of translating novel grants of criminal jurisdiction contained in civil rights statutes into lawful indictments; (3)
the moral and financial support, and legal talent, which came to the
aid of Klansmen who were brought to justice; (4) the local pariah
status of the victims of civil rights violations and the locally exalted
status of many of the violators; and (5) the general obstructionism
practiced by localities against the federal government's civil rights
enforcement effort.
The problems faced by the federal judiciary included (1) a rapid
and dramatic increase in case-load without a commensurate increase in human or material resources; (2) the intimidation of federal judges by local activism and (3) the illegitimate appearence of
the administration of justice by the federal judiciary which resulted
from (i) the domination of the federal legislative and executive
branches by the Republicans, (ii) the practice of excluding white
Southern Democrats from juries selected to indict and try federal
civil rights prosecutions; and (iii) the exhibition of partisan sympathies by the federal judiciary.
The problems posed by the practicalities of national politics included (1) the very success of the prosecution policy during the
years 1870-73; (2) widening distrust of President Grant's intentions
for the South and capacity to govern competently and honestly; (3)
the North's desire for final reconciliation with the white South; (4)
a national movement toward reducing government expenditures;
and (5) United States Supreme Court decisions that invalidated
statutes which were critical to the enforcement of federal civil
rights at the same time that the nation lost the political will to enact
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constitutionally tailored replacement statutes. The federal government achieved great success for a brief period in protecting the
fundamental civil rights of blacks and Republicans. After 1875,
however, the Justice Department and the federal courts lacked adequate authority to protect and enforce the fundamental rights of
American citizens. National political will was lacking to continue
the federal government's enforcement effort. Consequently, white
supremacists destroyed the power of the Republican Party in the
South and reduced Southern blacks to their control through organized violence. Later, emanicipation's promise of equal rights for
blacks was crushed by a legal system of racial discrimination
known as Jim Crow. Another eighty years passed before the federal government resumed the civil rights enforcement policies initiated during the Presidency of Ulysses S. Grant.

